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Aspects of the Optimal Interest Rate 
R. Albert Berry 
In recent years it has ,been practioners' conventional ~nsdmn:. that interest 
rates in less developed countries should be low; this means in practice 
''belo~-1 equilibrium" rates, if it is assumed that the marginal productivity 
of capital and the demand for credit are high, as appears generally to be the 
case. Public credit agencies are particularly prone to such policies towards 
agriculture, lou income housing, and some other sectors, In some cases 
restrictions placed on private sector interest rates have a similar effect,e.g.such 
such Government re<!'.ulations as interest rate ceilinr;s· the extent of inflation-­
which may make it difficult to achieve a reasonable real rate of interest because 
the nominal rate corresponding to it looks so hirh, and the agility of the 
banks in applying side conditions which raise the effective rate of interest 
above the nominal one (such as minimum balances and so on), determines the 
extent to which the private sector is also characterized by below equilibrium 
rates of interest. 
The wisdom of these policies is obviously open to que9t1on, and in recent 
years several countries have given them up, with apparently positive results. 
The whole problem warrants careful thought in any developing country. 
The argument usually presented in favor of a below equilibrium interest rate 
is that it is required to stimulate investment, given the risky nature of 
investment in less developed countries, the possible risk aversion of 
entrepreneurs, and so on. There are also arguments not arguing for. a generally 
helm., equilibrium rate but for a policy of maintaining selected rates below 
equilibrium, where it is thought that a given industry has external economies, 
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higher private than social risk, or some such chat:acteristic. tn such cases 
the argument would imply that, although the int:erest rate should be be.low 
the overall eqµilibrium for these sectors, for others it should be above it. 
With such an argument there can be no quarrel in principle. But the argument 
for an overall below equilibrium rate 5 which is usually the result of some 
sub-sectors maintaining such rates, appears to have little theoretical or 
practical defense. The li!,rgume,-:1.t is simple~ wllere the total amount of savings 
is a positive function of the interest rate paid to savers 5 t:hen ut,tless the 
government itself subsidizes the recipients of the below equ:J,librium interest. ' . ~ . . . .. 
rates--paying a higher rate or allo~ing a higher rate to be paid to savers than 
is paid by borrowers, then the interest rate sav,rs receive is belc:,w equilibrium, 
with the -.:-esult that total 1:1.avin~s ~4, ~,<.rrresponding, total investment: will be 
decreasecJ.. This, lo.ss can t>;e s~~n in Figure 1, wher~ t~e equilibri1.1Dl interest 
rate Re would cgrresp~A<i t~ a~ am?unt o! savin$s Se, bµt where the biterest 
rate fs maintained at th.e below equilibriugi level R
0 
? so the total amount of 
savings is only S
0
• Sinc::e investmf;nt is equal t() savings, it is naturally less 
with a lower interest rate than with a higher one; t.he luc~r recipients of 
the loans benefit and a~ e~ces.s detn,and for cred.it tnay be anticipated. The 
1marginal borrower receive.a a sul:>sidy o~ up to EF, ~mere subsidy refers to the 
di£ference between the co.st of cradit n:1d it1;1 value in use, for the marginal 
borrowers. This disequilibr:f.u:n sitqation., 11t least in t~~ st:mple model posited 
here, where there is no separation of market, reduces national income by a 
minimum of EAF; since t.he demand c1.1rve for credit represeµts the disco~nted 
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value of future productivity of capital for the borrower and the supply 
curve represents the opportunity cost to the lender, the area between these 
two curves and between the actual amount of savings and the equilibrium 
amount measures the minimu~ loss to he society from the existence of the below 
equilibrium interest rate. The loss will normally be greater than this, 
since the rationing procedure which replaces the price mechanism may be assumed 
to be less efficient and to fail to select those potential borrouers with 
the highest demand price as recipients of the funds. As just noted, there is 
in this situation an excess der.>and for credit (equal to FH in Figure 1); 
some credit hunters will have relatively low payoffs to the credit they receive, 
being candidates to receive it only because of the low interest rate. If, 
through an inefficient rationing procedure sol'le of the louer demand price 
borrowers receive credit and some of the hir,h demand price borrowers do not 
receive it, the total loss ~i~ht be several times EAF; at the extreme, if the 





s) and the set of potential recipients with the lowest demand 
prices (all ~ R
0, of course) get the credit, then totaL loss due to 
the disequilibriur:i interest rate policy would be BEFR - FAn.1 In the absence
0 
of more complex assuMptions, loss fron the disequilibrium policy will lie somewhere 
between the minimun level EAF and the maximum level BEFR
0 
- FAE, depending on the 
1The total benefit from the existence of the savings transfer Market (inwhich funds are transferred from savers to investors) in equilibriun is BAR
(the gain to borrowers) plus B.AR' (the gain to savers). In the disequilibriumsituation referred to in the texf, the rain to savers is reduced to :1.
0
Fc and
the gain to borrowers is EHF ( the difference. between the demand prices of theborrowers actua1ly receiving funds and the cost of the credit to them); thedifference between the gain in this case and that in the equilibrium case is
seen to be the area cited in the text. 
-4-
efficiency of the rationing systeM, where efficiency is defined by the allocation 
of credit to those with the highest denand price. 1 
The contention that a low interest rate will stimulate investment is of 
course errone·.ous when investment is linited to savings and the lm-, interest 
. 1 . 2rate is a stL.~u us to savings. Any attempt to increase the demand for a low 
investment by low interest rates and to satisfy it by money creation uill be 
inflationary and will not increase the real amount of investment even though it 
will increase investment in monetary terms. 3 (The acceptance of the "low interett 
1A frequent and rather well supported alleration with respect to credit
systems which do not operate on a price rationing basis is that in fact "firms
with low demand prices receive credit, because they have good connections with
the banks. If it may be assumed, as is probable, that the demand ~rice for
credit should be relatively lou on the part of large capital intensive firms
and higher for firms i;,i th smaller amounts of capital and presumably therefore
with higher marginal ;,roductivity of capital, then the fact that the large firms
usually have good connections and can achieve credit at ,,ill is hiP;hly consistent
with this proposition, both in terms of the productivity with uhich credit may be
used and in terms of its income distribution inpact. 
2
The argument presented here is based on the assumption that the supply
curve of savings is positively sloped; savings theorists are not fully agreed
on this issue, some arguing that there is little relation betueen the two
variables; if the savinp;s curve were vertical then the only loss to the society
as a whole from the disenuilibrium interest rate policy ~v0uld be the probable
inefficiency of the rationing system to replace the narket. 
If the offer curve of savings ~-,ere backuard bending~ the use of a below
equilibrium interest rate would foster savings, and unless the loss from in­
efficiency of the rationing procedure were freat, the net effect on the gronth
rate could be positive. -):::ve~ i11 this case, thoughj Felfare theory indi.c~~~s that
the non-equilibrium rate lowers welf~re; Le. a ·too hi?,h level of s·avings can
lower welfare when the opportunity cost is high enough. Eere the question of whether
individuals' preferences can be construed as the sole determinant of the optimal
savings rate becomes particularly crucial, although that issue arises in the
other cases as well. 
3Abstracting from the unlikely possibility that the develoning country
finds itself in a generalized Keynesian situation. 
-5-
rate argument 11 seems to be in part a result of the fallacy of composition, 
wherevby the fact that to the individual borrower a low interest rate is at­
tractive, leads to the conclusion that it is beneficial as a whole). Since 
the above analysis is oversimplified(especially given the assumption of a single 
credit market through which all savings flow and on which all investment is 
based) the results flowin~ from it cannot be imbued with much confidence; in 
the next section the model is complicated by allowing for different types of and 
uses for savings. 
Alternative Uses of Savings (from the savers point of view) 
A saver can choose among several alternative ways of disposing of his funds; 
for present purposes it is useful to distinguish four categories: direct use of 
the savings (by himself) in some investment project; lending then in the finan­
cial markets, i.e., savings deposits, purchases of bonds, purchases of stocks, 
etc.; holding them in the form of cash; and investment in non-reproduceable 
1and/or unproductive physical assets. 
To ascertain the implications of a non-equilibrium interest rate it is 
necessary to analyze in some detail how allocation among these forms of savings 
is related to the interest rate, as well as understanding how total savings 
depend on that rate. 2 
1As explained below, this category refers to that whole group of assets an 
increased demand for which does not lead to an increase in the total productive 
capital stock, either because supply is perfectly inelastic (e.g., land) or the 
capital good will not be used immediately (e.g., an .asset held for speculative 
reasons). 
2A full understanding of the choice of assets requires consideration of the 
attributes or characteristics of such assets which are important to the saver. 
Yield, risk, and liquidity are usually assumed to be the big ones. How these 
attributes vary among the four asset groups distinguished above, and how such 
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(Footnote 2 continued from page 5) 
differences depend on such conditions as the rate of price change will underlie. 
much of the discussion to followo 
The relevance of the distinction by savings channels depends on their being 
related to four possible effects of savings: the effects of interest are (a) in­
creased demand for prociuctive capital by the saver, resulting in an increased 
supply of that capital, (b) increased deilland for productive capital by someone 
else (to whom the funds have been transferred)~ resulting in an increased supply 
of that capital, (c) increased demand for assets where the increased demand does 
not lead to an increased supply of any capital good--either because the demand 
is for a non-reproducible capital good (like land) or because it is for a con-
sumer good (e.g", consumer durables) the stimulation of whose output--even if it 
occurs--does not increase the total productive capacity of the economic system, 
(d) increased demand for money balances. Our four savings channels are designed 
to correspond to these four effects, though inevitably the relation is not c9m­
plete. Thus, if the supply elasticity of a certain producible capital good is 
zero (in the relevant pri.ce range) the effect on total capital stock of an 
increase in demand fo:r it is zero; the effect is the same as if the good were 
not producible. Or it may be that transferred savings are invested in ways 
which do not increase the capital stock. 
Note that savings which leads to increased production of a capital good 
which is in excess supply at..d underutilized (as often argued in the case of 
luxury housing) really corresponds to category (c) above. Also falling in this 
category is the purchase in advance of use (of in advar.ce of the time of purchase 
had the capital market functioned be.:ter) '.>f consume1· durables; until consumed, 
their holding as inventory const:1.tutes the b.oldi.ng of unutilized capital. 
It is clear tl~at the in:f.tia1 or partial impact of the use· of savi·ags will 
not generally be the same as: its ge.nera.1 equilibrium effect, the latter naturally 
being much harder to e~1aluate. The discussion here is based essentially on the 
assumption that the general equilibrium effects of different uses differ in the 
same direction (though obviously not necessarily in the same degree) as the 
partial or direct effects. While such an assumption certainly seems more ap­
propriate than its opposite, it implies that the analysis is only a first step, 
and would have to be substantially complicated before firm conclusions could be 
drawn. 
A furtb.e.r real world complication is that the various effects distinguished 
here come :i.n all degrees, e.g. ~ the effect of an increase in demand for a given 
capital good on its output is not necessarily either zero or equal to the 
demand, it is usually between these two extremes. In this respect, too, our 
discussion oversimplifies an<l makes distinctions in kind which in the real 
world are much more likely to be differences in degree. Note that monetary 
savings e.re. ,~c-.1.ally prcsu:ned to lE.ad to an amount of investment equal to the 
savings, but th:i.o is in fact a matter requiring analysis. 
The conditions which give ea('h savings channel its yield, risk, and 
liquidity characteristics are clearly big elements in any discussion such as 
the present cneo 
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In Figure 2, plausible relationships between these various forms of savings 
and the interest rate are traced out. The implicit assumption is that total 
savings are a positive function of the rate of interest as indicated by the 
S slcurve Note that the rate of interest measured on the vertical axis ist t • 
that corresponding to transferred savings; the rate of return is not generally the 
same for .all forms and it remains to consider what relationship, if any, exists· 
among the rates correspondin~ to the different assets. To the extent that 
the real rate of interest on money balances (zero when there is no inflation or 
deflation) is a function of the rate of interest in the transferred savings 
1market, the analysis presented here is too simple; some complications are con-
sidered below. 
Holding constant (e.g., at the level zero) the real rate of interest on 
money balances, it may be assumed that those balances will be a negative func­
tion of the (real) rate of interest on transferred savings, as suggested by 
1the curve S S • A similar monotonically negative relationship may be expectedmm 
to hold with respect to own investments of savings (shown by the curve S s1)
0 0 
though here it must be assumed that the rate of return on such investments is 
a (positive) function of the rate of interest on transferred savings. 2 The 
1relative position of curves like S s1 and S s would of course vary with the o o mm 
individual or entity, but is not considered further here, since we are inter­
ested essentially in their relative relationships with the rate of interest 
1i.e., to the extent that events in the savings markets help. to determine 
the rate of inflation. 
2
Assuming that each saver has a diminishing rate of return to capital in 
own investment~ a lowered r on transferred savings--leading him to effect more 
own investment--will lower-that rate of return as well. The precise relation­
ship between the two rates would depend on the individualvs preference system, 
among other things, and need not concern us'here. 
-8-
Market Equilibrium Savings C"~ves, By Use of Savings 
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on transferred savings. Another savings use mentioned--application to the pur­
chase of non-reproducible or non-productive assets (which 9 as the term indicates, 
1 may or may not be used in the production process), bears a less obvious relation 
1rt is useful 9 at this point, to distinguish between the market equilibrium 
savings curves for the population as a whole-(as shown in Fig. 2) and the 
curves of a representative individual who, at a point of time, takes as con­
stant all those variables exogeneoGs to him except the t-s rate of interest. 
Figure 3 could repr2sent the p~eferences of such an individual. If the equi­
librium rate of inter0st is taken as bnse,(i.e., if the individual assumes 
that, as the t-s i~terest rate is m&nipulated, all other variables exogenous 
to him will remain cor.sta:c-t at tr~e level corresponding to the situation where 
R = R) the representative :individual and the economy would have the same per­
centa~e dist:r:tbutio1,.s of sci-rings at that equilibrium rate, but not at other 
interest rates, since the individual is assumed not to take into account the 
changes in other va:::•::_s.bles ~vhich :\'."esult indirectly from the change in the t-s 
interest rate; i.e. , ~o-:\en the i11-:erest rate is Re~ the representative sa:ver 
distributes his savings in the propor::i.ons indicat~d in Figure 2 (RM in the 
eform of monetary savings 1 KO in the form of own investment 9 RN in the n-p 
assets, and R T in t,~ansfor~ed savings 1 to give a total of R J'y. Comparing 
Figure 3 curv~s to th')Se of Fignre 2 1 :::..ndica"':es how the chan~e of other vari­
ables accompanving the decr,":ase in the interest rate from R to R leads to 
different savi~gs p 1tt:,:r11.s from those which would be extrap5lated
0 
by the 
summation of ir.dividual exp,~ctations when the interest rate was still R • (The 
individual's savings disU~ibution at the interest rate R is comoosed of R 0 9 
of his own savings 1 R Nv of n-p asset purch.ases 9 R 11v ~n the m~netary fo~, 
and R T' in transferrgd savings to give a total of R0 Q. "(,,,rnat the individual 
does &ot predict correctly in forming his ex ante plans on savings composition 
at R is the r-ise in price of n-p a.ssets ~ or, what is the same thing, the 
fall
0 
in R associated with the fall in R (it is also possible that the 
return onnRis own investment is related to the amount of such investment carried 
out by others and/or the runount of investment based on savings transfers. The 
"expected" relationship L-1 each case is presumably negative, though there 
would be many exceptions). It would be extreme to assume that no fall in R 
would be expected by the individual, but it seems likely that he will under~p 
estimate the full extent of this general equilibrium effect. Such an under­
estimate would imply that his ex ante n-p savings would be above the level 
actually resulting when R falls, i..e., R N1 of Fig. 3· > R ~:' .of Fig. 2 • If 
his total savings at R were correctly p~edicted by the ind~vidual when R=R j 
then one or more of th~ other three savings forms would have to be underestimated 
by him--ve:r.y possibly all would be. Whether he will over or underestimate his 
savings at R depends on which of the price effect (one form of investment yields 
less ex post
0 
than he predicted) the wealth illusion effect (his n-p assets rise 
in price more than he expected) and the liquidity effect (his liquidity rises 
more than he predicted) predominate. In Fig, 3 we assume no error in prediction 
of total savings A ::epresentativ.2 individual vs curves could be drawn based on 
each eother possible t-s interest ;:ate (i.e.) assuming the values of all other 
variables in the s:;rstern at the levels corrc~sponding to each other t-s interest 
rate). The curves of F1g. 2 .::..rE,,in effe~t 1 the loci of the positions of each 
curve at the ~ used as base for d;:-awing the curves in a given figure; i.e., the 
Fig. 2 levels of each form of sa·-1ings at R.. correspond to the ex ante levels 
shown by the curves correspcndin6<> to the eiistence of R. and the associated - 1
levels of the other vc:.riaoles endogenous to the system. 
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Ex Ante Saving-s Curves of the· Representative 
Individual When R • R . e 
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to the interest rate even in the absence of any relationship between the rate of 
inflation and the rate of interest on transferred savings. There is, however, 
much reason to expect a relationship between the rate of interest on these goods 
and the rate on transferred savings (or other uses) especially in the case of 
non-reproducible assets like land, but also for real estate and some other assets. 
Factors helping to determine this relationship are the differences between trans-
£erred-saving assets and n-p 1 assets in char~cteristics other than capital (i.e., 
risk and liquidity) and the mobility of investors between the two types of as­
sets. In a world without risk or illiquidity or inflation, and with perfectly 
mobile investors (as between assets) the rate of return on n-p assets would 
be the same as on transferred-savings assets. The price of the former would 
change in such a way as to make the rental/~rice ratio co~respond to the (general) 
interest rate, thus a rise in r would lead to a lowering of price. Such asset 
price changes might or might not have wealth or liquidity effects on the over­
all savings--interest rate relation--see the discussion below. If, for whatever 
reason (e.g., lack of familiarity) investors are somewhat immobile between assets, 
the rate of return on n-p assets will be a positive function of but will not 
move by the same amount as the t-s2 interest rate. Finally» the more the 
attractiveness of n-p assets to the marginal buyers lies in features different 
from yield (like low risk or high liquidity), the less will the rate of return 
in this market be tied to that of the t-s market. 3 Whatever the precise 
1
This symbol will henceforth be used to refer to non-reproducible and/or 
non currently productive assets. 
2Transferred savings. 
3 we abstract here from the multitudinous second-order effects which come into 
play in the real world~ e.g., the risk attached to the holding of n-p assets 
is in turn a function of the extent to 11hich that market is tied to the t-s 
market. 
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values of these various relevant coefficients, the normal relation between an 
individual's ex ante investment in the n-p market and the t-s interest rate will 
be negative; the two interest rates will tend to move in the same direction. 
Since the supply of n-p goods is fixed (or nearly so) the change in demand for 
them leads to changes in their price. This means that the negative relationship 
between ex ante savings channelled to the n-p market and the rate of interest on 
transferred savings does not show up in the market equilibrium curve correspond­
ing to this market; by definition that curve coincides with the vertical axis, 
unless in fact the production of some goods falling in this category does have 
positive elasticity. In that instance the market equilibrium curve will have 
negati ve - 1s~ope. 
1The transferred savings curve, indicated by stst shows the positive re-
lationship which that variable is expected to bear to the real rate of interest. 
Note that even if total savings are not a positive function of the interest rate 
on transferred savings, transferred savings are almost certain to be, unless 
the overall relationship is quite negative. The price effect of a higher E. 
should have a positive effect on the share of total savings which are transferred. 
Two other effects are likely to be at work. The conventional income effect, 
whereby the greater ease of achieving a given future consumption level is ex­
pected to lead--other things being equal--to an increase in present consumption 
1As indicated above, durable consumer goods which the individual plans to 
use himself later will fall into this category, and the demand for them will be 
a decreasing function of the interest rate on transferred savings; demand for 
durable consumer goods which the individual does not plan to use himself must 
be speculative in some sense of the term, although he need not be expecting an 
increase in the real value of the assets, if the real rate of interest on money
isj for examplei negative then the individual would be expected to speculate on 
certain forms of final consumer goods or other goods as long as their rate of 
return were expected to be less negative than that of money itself. 
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(decrease in savings); in other words it works against the price effect. A 
second effect referred to above works through the price of non-reproducible or 
slowly reproducible capital goods and may better be termed a combination liquidity­
income effect. In the absence of significant wealth illusion-its effect will be 
in the same direction as the price effect. Consider a non-reproducible asset 
like land. An increase in r would lead to a decrease in the demand for land 
(a now relatively less attractive asset) and as a result a decrease in its price. 
(The price decrease gives sufficient incentive to buyers so that there is a 
holder for every unit of these assets.) One effect of the price decrease, is 
to lead to a decrease in wealth; although the real productive capacity of the 
system stays the same its value in terms of power to purchase current consumer 
goods decreases. This would appear to constitute a factor tending to increase 
the total savings rate. If, however, the asset holders consider not the con­
sumer goods purchaseable now with their assets but those purchaseable in the 
future, nothing has changed. In the absence of a .iwealth illusion" whereby 
the individual does believe his wealth level has fallen 1 change mightno occur. 
One effect, however~ is a decrease in his liquidity (relevant in the event, for 
example, that contrary to his basic plan he should have to realize some of these 
assets before he planned) and this could lead to a justifiable increase in 
savings to offset that liquidity reduction. In short, it appears that the only 
plausible effect which might work against a positive savings--interest rate 
return would be the conventional income effect. 
To summarize this section: as a first step in the (necessarily more compli­
cated) analysis of the impact of manipulations of the transferred savings inter­
est rate, we have assumed that such manipulations do not lead either directly 
-14-
or indirectly to changes in the rate of inflation and we have ignored most 
second order effects. Such interactions do not create any conceptual problems, 
since the curves presented in Figure 2 can be thought of as the market equili­
brium paths of the variables in question (in response to a change in the t-s 
interest rate} for any degree of complexity in the economic system. Figure 2 
should be interpreted as taking into account those general equilibrium impacts 
which have been included in the discussion. As we see below, the curves could 
have quite different shapes in economic systems with different characteristics, 
e.g., if the rate of interest acts through other variables, like inflation, back 
on the variables discussed here. In the discussion presented above, the only 
indirect impact considered on savings was that of the increase of private wealth 
due to the increased tendency to invest in non-reproducible assets, and since 
this would normally be expected if anything to decrease total savings, it would 
s i mp1y accen t uate t he · · ' f ' s c-positive S..LOpe o tne " 1 curve anu.3 s,rould, not change thet t ,,.. ~ 
qualitati.ve nature of the arp-ument. 
The Influence of Inflation and Its Interaction with the Variables Considered 
It seems probable that in most economic systems the inflation rate is 
associated with voluntary savings via a process whereby the government feels 
obliged to undertake a certain amount of spending on infrastructure and other 
services, and possibly also to allocate a minimum amount of credit to the private 
sector, somewhat independently of the level of the voluntary savings. 1 When this 
is the case, the rate of inflation and the level of savings are likely to be 
1Put more generally, if voluntary savings are low, the government is likely1 
among the feasible policj.packages available to it, to prefer one which involves 
inflation. 
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inversely related; such a condition means that the assumption (used in the above 
discussion) that inflation is not an endogenous variable to the system is in­
correct. The analysis may also differ somewhat if a rate of price change not 
equal to zero is assumed, even though it is not related causally to the other 
variables considered. This case is discussed first, since it is simpler than 
that involving interaction of inflation and the other variables. 
Conceptually it is possible (though in the real world not very probable) 
that the presence of inflation will not affect those real variables which deter­
mine the rate of return on own investment or on transferred savings; if this 
were the casej then these t:1,10 curves might not be expected to shift as between 
a non-inflationary situati0'1 and an inflationary one, provided that either the 
other two curves did not shiftj or that there wer no causal links between the 
two pairs of curYes. It seems clear, however, that each form of savings is a 
1substitute in some degree for each of the others; since the curve S S would mm 
shift to the lefts by a greater amount the higher the level of inflation it may 
be anticipated that the transferred savings and own-investment curves will shift 
1to the right, relative to those of Figure 2. The effect on the S S curve np np 
is less predictable; it seems probable~ however, that this curve will also 
shift to the right, 1 since n-p assets may be rather close substitutes for money 
balances for many people, i.e., the lower rate of return on liquidity is likely 
to lead to an increasing tendency--other things being equal·--to invest in non­
productive assets; this will generate a greater upward trend in their prices 
1As observed in the preceding section, for this curve not to coincide with 
the vertical axis, there must be. some producible goods (with positive supply 
elasticity in the rele,:rant p~dce. range) included in the n-p category. We are 
assuming that in this disc1~ssion. 
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than would otherwise occur, or more precisely~ a higher real price series over 
time for these assets than would have evolved in the non-inflationary situation 1 
for the non-reproducible items in the bundlej and a greater supply of the pro­
ducible ones. If it is true that total savings is a positive function, other 
things being equal, of the attractiveness of each form of savings, then total 
savings will be less under inflationary circu~stances. 
Analysis of the overall impact of inflation of course must take into account 
the distribution of the additional spending which caused it in the first place. 2 
If that spending was oriented more towards investment than was the reduction in 
real purchases by persons so affected, then the total impact on investment and 
savings could be positive. In the extreme case where inflation resulting from 
government investment did not decrease the savings of the private sector at all, 
it woulc be almost a foregone conclusion that total savings and investments would 
rise as a result of it. Or in a case where all the additional spending was on 
consumption, the impact would almost certainly be negative; only if the wealth 
effect on savings was very strongly positive could this result be avoided. 
Inflation as an Endogenous Variable 
In the preceding section, it was assumed that the rate of inflation was an 
exogenous variable, and although it affected the relative attractiveness of 
various forms of savings, it was not causally related to interest rate policy. 
In fact, both a low voluntary savings rate (which is likely to result from a 
below equilibrium interest rate)and the high demand created by a below equilibrium 
1
An additional factor likely to be at work in situations where the rate of 
inflation fluctuates, and in so doing creates greater relative price uncertainty 
for some products than for others--and greater fluctuations in the real value. 
2Assuming the inflation is basically of the demand pull type. 
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rate, are likely to put inflationary pressures on the system. 1 With the rate of 
inflation a negative function of the interest rate~ the market equilibrium curves 
of the savings variables considered here are altered. Assume that with the equi­
librium interest rate R inflationary pressures are just under control, but withe 
any lower interest rate, inflation would result. 
The effect of this complication is to make market equilibrium curve analysis 
more difficult; in some cases it appears to make the curves more elastic to the 
interest rate than otherwise, but others it throws even their slopes into question. 
Consider the savings in money balances curve; in the absence of inflation it had 
a clearly negative slope, but if the rate of inflation is a decreasing function 
of the t-s interest rate, the inflation corresponding to a low interest rate 
would tend to discourage the holding of money balances so the slope of this 
2curve is undefined--it could be negative or positive. In the case the own inves.t-
ment: curve ..which in the absence of inflation bears a negative relationship to 
the interest rate, that relationship should be stronger under inflation, 3 since 
the holding of money balances is less attractive than in the previous case. 
The slope of the n-p savings curve will probably also be lower than before, i.e., 
its elasticity to the interest rate will be greater than before, partly because 
money balances are less attractive, and partly because of the greater relative 
1
In turn the presence of inflation is difficult to reverse because it makes
high real interest rates difficult to alter due to institutional restrictions
weighing against high nominal rates.
2under inflation, the nominal t-s interest rate is, of course, above the
real one. Choosing a real t-s interest rate is a less straightforward maneuver,
since policy normally acts directly on the nominal rate. But under normal as­
sumptions with respect to the financing of the economy, there will be a monotonic
relationship between the two rates so th.at with full knowledge of that relation
it remains possible to set the real rate at the desired level.
3Even if the rate of interest on transferred savings does not contain a
higher risk component than before (due to variations in the rate of inflation)
it may well be assumed to have. 
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price uncertainty frequently built into inflationary situations. If this is so, 
a decrease in the real interest rate which causes inflation will lead to a 
greater increase in real wealth associated with n-p assets than would a non­
inflationary decrease in the interest rate, hence the negative impact of the low 
t-s interest rate on total savings will be greater than in the other cases con­
sidered~ 
Summary and Further Considerations 
The above analysis has focussed on three ways in which the transferred 
savings interest rate is related to savings behavior and the contribution of 
savings to welfare, with a view to ascertaining in particular whether a below 
equilibrium rate is likely to constitute a wise policy. Aspects considered were 
(a) the efficiency of allocation of transferred savings according to whether 
price rationing or some other form of rationing is used (b) the way in which 
the allocation of savings among forms (transferred, invested by the saver, put 
in money balances or purchase of non-reproducible assets and/or non-productive 
assets) is related to the transferred-savings interest rate and the impact of 
this allocation on total savings, the efficiency of resource utilization and 
(c) the overall impact on total savings. Theory provides no answer as to whe­
ther, in a country with substantial capital market and other imperfections, the 
optimal rate of interest is the equilibrium one, (or ones, given the existence 
1i.e., the short run impact of the low interest rate on savings via the 
wealth effect should be particularly negative, whether the long run impact is 
less severe is unclear; possibly failure of real wealth to rise as fast it other­
wise would have creates an incentive for higher savings. But though the long 
run impact may be mitigated by this factor it could not reverse the overall re­
sult. And if "vicious circle" type phenomena come into play over time, the 
short run impact could be accentuated over time. 
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somewhat separated markets) but it does provide interesting guidelines on the 
mechanisms by which higher or lower interest rates may affect the situation. 
Theory suggests that below equilibrium interest rates run a high risk of (a) lower­
ing total savings, (b) worsening the allocation of transferred savings among 
borrowers, and (c) promoting inflation which in itself is likely to discourage 
savers and further lower the savings rate. 1 
Even if it were possible to ascertain the coefficients introduced into the 
above analysis and which are necessary components of an answer to the.interest 
rate question--some important unknowns would remain to be considered, in par-
ticular the relative social efficiency of savings used in the various ways cited. 
If a saver had the alternative of investing his own funds or transferring them 
through the system, but a peso of transferred savings did not lead to a peso of 
investment, then the net effect on savings (investment) of the transfer would 
be negative. The coefficients of "net .additional investment to additional trans­
ferred savings" may be greater than one or less than one; this factor must be 
borne very much in mind.in the analysis of the relative effi~iency of the two 
forms. Both the saver's and the potential borrower's own investment curves 
1one perhaps extreme framework within which the savings-interest rate-­inflation nexus could be viewed would include a public sector with inflexiblegoals on public investment--which are satisfied by money creation regardless ofthe level of inflation--the impact on private sector saving and investment mightthen be deduced and the relation between the original nominal interest rate andthe resulting real interest and total savings levels traced out. One argument. mentioned above was that the impact of a below equilibrium savings rate would beto increase pressures on the public entities to disperse more credit than other­wise; this might suggest a tendency for total investment to rise (assuming thecredit is sought primarily for investment purposes). If the negative wealtheffects of the inflation fell especially on people with high wealth elasticitiesto consume? this could easily occur. It might even be that a low governmentcapacity to save would promote investment, if via an initial negative impact onthe real interest rate (through government borrowing from the central bank) itraised the demand for private investment credit and satisfied that demand viafurther money creation which cut :Lnto private consumption.
In short, while the general case may have inflation lowering the savingsrate, this cannot be taken for granted. 
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are involved; whether total investment r·1seswhen a dollar is transferred depends 
on the relationship between transferred savings and own savings for the trans­
ferrer and for the borrm·1er, as well as the relative efficiency of use of savings 
by the two. Innumerable empirical situations can be conceived. Some further 
generalizations can be made" however. Probably the easiest of the. relation­
ships to analyze in this context is that between transferred and own invested 
savings. In a riskless world with no transfer costs, the individual would equate 
the rate of return on his own investment (R) and the rate of return on trans-o 
ferred savings investment (Rt). In the real world the rate of return he himself 
would receive on transferred savings (Rti) would be equal to the gross social rate 
of return on that invest~ent (Rts) minus (a) the real cost of transfer (Rct), 
(b) any above normal profits involved in the intermediation process (Rfft) and 
(c) the differential earned by the borrower as a result of being able to borrow 
the funds O\t); (~1e assume in other words that typical borrower is not the 
marginal borroTTer, whose demand price interest rate is equal to the supply price 
interest rate). 1 Assuming pure competition in the intermediation service it pays, 
both from an individual and a social point of view, to distribute savings so as 
to push the rate of return on m•m investment down farther than that on transferred 
savings due to the unavoidable real cost of the transfer; if there are monopoly 
profits in the intermediation process, however, too many funds tend to go into 
own investment, relative to the social optimum. In a world with risk, direct 
utility or disutility from certain ways of do:lng things, etc., a number of other 
such factors must be taken into account. Some individuals probably have a pref­
erence to control their own investment even at a lower interest rate than what they 
could recaive in transferred savings; others have the opposite preference. In terms 
1For the marginal borrm•,er, this last term drops out, Rts being also below 
the average R~s on ·all funds passing through the market. In terms of efficiency
of resource allocation, it is the marginal borrower uho matters, of course. 
-21-
of overall welfare maximization it is appropriate that these preferences be an 
input into the determination of the distribution of funds between the two uses, 
so there is no reason to expect inefficiency to result from them. 
The risk problem is something different. It is frequently the case that 
risk is less on transferred savings, since the ultimate combination of invest­
ments which they support is more varied and balanced than that which an individual 
would have; for this reason he may tend to transfer to a point where the average 
rate of return to him on transferred savings is below that on his own invest­
ment; given the lack of a perfect market to insure him against fluctuations in 
the rate of return on his own investment, this is presumably optimal since his 
own welfare is directly lowered if he has to bear too high a risk level. A 
second form of risk, however, may create inefficiencies. The saver who in trans­
ferring his savings runs a risk of being deceived in some way or other by the 
recipient of the funds opti:::al may be expected to decrease his savings trans­
fer below its otherwise opti"'lal level; this will tend to lower total national 
income as traditionally measured, i.e., assumin~ the sane narginal utility of 
income for each person; If certain interpersonal comparisons (for example, 
assuming that the deceivers should be assigned a lower marginal utility of in­
come than the honest people) are made, this result ~rould not necessarily hold. It 
is possible, of course, that sooe individuals will have to little risk aversion of 
this sort, for their own good, and this could also decrease total income by 
encouragin~ entreµreneurs to enter the deception industry. 
The impact of the below equilibrium interest rate on transfer savings is, 
as noted above, likely to lead to some redistribution towards own investment of 
savings and away from transfer. If the marginal social productivity of the two 
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uses was equal before, or would be equal under an equilibrium interest rate, it 
will now, of course, be unequal and the overall efficiency of use of the savings 
will have decreased. If the marginal social productivity of transferred savings 
was below that of own investment savings before, however, the opposite will be 
the case, and the restriction on the transfer will lead to an increase in effi­
ciency of resource utilization; if the opposite relation would hold with an 
equilibrium interest rate, the loss will be increased by the new factor. Empiri­
cally speaking, most observers would probably argue that the marginal productivty 
is higher on transferred savings than on own-used savings, due to lack of 
familiarity with the capital markets, the fact that a demand for investment funds 
usually reflects a good project with substantial payoff, the fact that funds are 
frequently transferred from individuals with very few, if any, _nvestment 
opportunities, and so on. The relevant comparison is linked to the marginal 
savers, however, and it remains an empirical question whether this is true or 
not for them; it seems likely that those with very few alternatives for their 
own savings will in fact be intramarginal transferers, i.e., they will transfer 
even at a well below equilibrium interest rate; those whose transfer will or 
will not occur, according to whether the interest rate is at equilibrium or at 
some point below it, may have fairly good opportunities for own investment. 
In fact it would appear that efficiency is very much a function of the par­
ticular capital market in a given economy; some markets take funds from certain 
types of borrowers and pass them to certain types of borrowers and other markets 
involve different people on each side of the flow. It seems probable for some less 
developed countries that those markets nhich channel funds to large already capital 
intensiva firms with ~enerally good access to funds may not be leading to any 
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increase in national income. In any case, the whole question is an empirical 
one calling for a good deal of detailed study and disaggregation of the capital 
market system. 
The social productivity of savings which are held in money balances must be 
appraised indirectly, and may depend substantially on the way in which the 
monetary-fiscal system works, on the flexibility of prices in a downward direc­
tion, and on a number of other factors. 
The simplest situation in which to analyze this problem is one where either 
prices are flexibk downwards so that a decrease in aggregate demand does not 
lead to any non-utilization of resources, or where the government's counter­
cyclical monetary and fiscal policies reinject into the circular flow any funds 
removed permanently via savings in these forms. Under these conditions has 
the opportunity to determine the use of the resources freed by the saving in 
question Gither the government or the monetary systern(or both if the two 
systems are well coordinated] so the use would be final either in government 
expenditures or credit from the backing system to the private sector which was 
deemed to provide a higher payoff. In either case, this is the most efficient 
form of transfer in the broad sense of the term, since there is less inter­
mediation cost in getting the funds from the saver to the investor than in the 
typical case; for example, if the monetary system expands to make up for the 
savings the costs are only those of allocating funds to the investors, not of 
managing savings accounts, and so on. In the case of the government the costs 
are almost certainly much less, since the alternative is taxes and the collec-
tion cost of taxes plus possible disincentive costs may well be substantial. 
1It is true, of course that in a system which does not have mechanisms 
1 
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The conclusion that hoarding may be the most efficient form of savings from 
a social point of view creates a complexity in the discussion of the optimum rate 
of interest on transferred savings. Assuming that an artificial decrease in 
that rate (i.e., to a below equilibrium rate) will imply an increase both in own 
investment and in hoarding (we abstract for the moment from the fourth possible 
use--the purchase of 11n-p assets, 11 it may well be the case that the substitution 
of own investment for transferred savings implies a decrease in the efficiency 
of resource utilization and the substitution of hoarding for transferred savings 
implies an increase. Finally, of course, there is the effect on total savings, 
generally assumed to bP. negative. In such a case there would be two substitu­
tions tending to worsen th· allocati~-- of resour~es (includin8 one between savings 
and consumption) and a third tending to improve it; whether the net impact is 
positive or negative bc~omes an empirical question. 1 The effects of the below 
equilibrium interest rate could vary in different subsectors of the capital 
market, and for different ranges of the transferred savings interest rates. The 
possibility that a below equilibrium rate would bring gains depends considerably, 
it should be pointed out, on there not being any inflation so that the rate of 
return on liquidity is at least not heavily negative. If it is, it seems un­
likely that many people will turn to liquid assets when the t-s interest rate 
falls. 
Footnote 1 continued from page 23. 
available to assure the full utilization of resources, savings in the form of 
hoarding may be the worst thing that can happen, since it involves a decrease in 
aggregate demand on the part of one person with no compensating increase on any­
one else's part; this is, of course, the Keynesian problem. But it is another 
irony of economics that what is the worst possible phenomenon in the Keynesian 
world may be the best possible phenomenon in a neoclassical or non-Keynesian world. 
One could also argue, perhaps, that this transfer mechanism is not as ef­
ficient as it appears in that it may lead to instability in the system with a 
high level of liquidi~y. but thes~ problems are at a different level of discussion 
from the ones we consider here. 
1A further facto::: consi:iered above, of course)) is the presumed greater in­




Another question frequently raised is the impact of the interest rate on 
employment and income distribution. It is frequently argued that low interest 
rates favor highly capital intensive enterprises, and thereby restrain the 
demand for labor, and create unemployment. At one level of analysis the impact 
of a below equilibrium interest rate on the demand for and price of labor is 
fairly straightforward; given perfect markets for labor and assuming that in 
spite of the below squilibrium price of capital all firms tend to have the same 
relative marginal productivities of labor and capital, the below equilibrium 
interest rate may be expected to lower the demand curve for labor and decrease 
the equilibrium wage rate ,ria the discouragement of savings and decreased total 
investment, in a system where the labor market is imperfect it might,instead, 
create unemployment. Such an analysis, however, is not very instructive, since 
it is almost a foregone conclusion that in the presence of a subsidy to the use 
of capital to certain borrowers, other borrowers will not receive the subsidy, 
the relative marginal productivities of labor and capital will not be the same 
for all firms, and there will be not only an impact on the overall capital labor 
ratio, but also an impact on the distribution of labor across firms; this com­
plicates the effect on employment and/or the wate rate. i·Jhether in fact the low 
interest rate tends to generate high capital intensity is a complicated matter 
whose analysis requires ·some consideration at least of the dynamics of firms of 
different types in an eco~omy with this imperfection in the capital market. Few 
generalizations seem warranted. 
